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Rise and Decline of Right-Wing Extremism  
in the Czech Republic in the 1990s* 
 
MARTIN KREIDL** 
KLÁRA VLACHOVÁ** 
Institute of Sociology, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, Prague 
Abstract: This paper explores the recent history, regional correlates and social 
background of right wing extremism in the Czech Republic, namely of the Republi-
can party (SPR-RSČ). First, it briefly describes the development of right-wing ex-
tremism in the Czech Republic over the last decade. Further, it reviews sociological 
theories about the rise of the extreme right in Europe and tests the applicability of 
these theories to SPR-RSČ. Our findings reveal that social background does not dis-
tinguish republican voters from their counterparts in other European countries. Con-
sequently, electoral volatility between left- and right-wing parties and SPR-RSČ is 
analysed placing the party somewhere in the left part of the Czech political spec-
trum. Next, some regional correlates of Czech right-wing extremism are investi-
gated. A higher inclination towards right wing extremism is found in rural regions 
with high unemployment and crime rates. The final section of the paper suggests 
possible explanations for electoral failure of SPR-RSČ in the elections into the 
Chamber of Deputies in June 1998. We argue that social insecurity and rising unem-
ployment may have led a number of SPR-RSČ supporters to vote left. Furthermore, 
SPR-RSČ failed to mobilise non-voters and first-time voters in 1998. 
Czech Sociological Review, 2000, Vol. 8 (No. 1: 69-91) 
1. Right-wing Extremist Parties and Creating a Democracy after Communism 
Post-communist transformation involves a number of antinomies and dilemmas that are 
difficult to overcome. Creating “democracy without democrats” was one of the biggest 
challenges post-communist societies faced in 1989 [Sztompka 1992: 20]. Was it feasible 
to expect that the process of creating and running a democracy would be trouble-free 
when fundamental resources of a working democratic society were lacking after forty 
years of communist rule? Sztompka argues that among all the post-communist deficien-
cies, the lack of education, political culture and democratic civic virtues were the most 
serious. Moreover, post-communist societies had neither professional politicians nor loyal 
bureaucrats. 
In the course of the 1990s, it turned out that many post-communist citizens really 
restrained from accepting democratic civic virtues. For instance, many extreme right-
wing parties enjoyed significant public support.1 The Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, 
                                                     
*) This research paper was supported by grants No. 403/99/1129 and No. 403/99/1128 by GA ČR. 
**) Direct all correspondence to Klára Vlachová, Institute of Sociology, Academy of Sciences of 
the Czech Republic, Jilská 1, 110 00 Praha 1, Czech Republic; e-mail vlachova@soc.cas.cz and/or 
kreidl@mbox.cesnet.cz 
1) For a more detailed analysis of this term and related terminology (such as radical right, extreme 
right, national-populist right, etc.) and relationships among them, please see [Dvořáková 1997, 
Fiala 1998, Fiala and Mareš 1998, Strmiska 1998 or Westle and Niedermayer 1992]. 
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Slovak National Party, Slovenian National Party, Hungarian Justice and Life Party and 
Bulgarian Business Block achieved parliamentary representation (consult Table 1 for 
details). In the Czech Republic, Sdružení pro republiku-Republikánská strana Českoslo-
venska (Association for the Republic-Republican Party of Czechoslovakia, hereinafter 
referred to as the “SPR-RSČ”) played a substantial role in parliamentary politics between 
1992 and 1998. 
Table 1. Electoral Support of Extremist Parties in the Last Elections by Country 
  Election 
Country Name result (%) Year 
Australia One Nation (ON) 8.4 1998 
Austria Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ) 26.9 1999 
Belgium Vlaams Blok (VB) 9.9 1999 
Bulgaria Balgarski Biznes Blok (BBB) 4.9 1997 
Denmark Dansk Volkeparti (DV) 7.4 1998 
 Fremskridtspartiet (FrP) 2.4 1998 
France Front National (FN) 14.9 1997 
Germany Die Republikaner (REP) 1.8 1998 
 Deutsche Volksunion (DVU) 1.2 1998 
Hungary Magyar Igazság és Elet Pártja (MIEP) 5.5 1998 
Italy Movimento Sociale Fiamma Tricolore (MSI) 1.7 1996 
Norway Fremskrittspartiet (FP) 15.3 1997 
Russia Blok Zhirinovskogo (Liberalno-demokratitcheskaja  
 partija Rossiji (LDPR) 6.0 1999 
Slovakia Slovenská národná strana (SNS) 9.1 1998 
Slovenia Slovenska nacionalna stranka (SNS) 3.2 1996 
Switzerland Schweizer Demokraten/Démokrates Suisses 
  /Demokratici Svizzeri (SD) 1.8 1999 
Note: The year is that of the last election into the lower house of the Parlia-
ment; percentage is the percentage of votes won by the party (in case 
of two-round elections, we note the first round’s gain). 
Source: European Political Resources 
(http://www.agora.stm.it/politic/europe.html). 
 
This paper aims to describe one of the post-communist right-wing extremist parties, 
namely the Czech SPR-RSČ. In the introduction, we will briefly outline its history. The 
party was founded in 1990, successfully entered high parliamentary politics in 1992 and 
did not regain parliamentary representation in the 1998 elections. We seek to explain its 
initial success and subsequent failure. An overview of theories of right-wing extremism 
in western countries in the 1980s and particularly a description of its social base form the 
background of the analysis. May these concepts be successfully applied to SPR-RSČ? 
First, we try to locate the party in the Czech political spectrum. Further, we show how 
voting for SPR-RSČ is associated with regional characteristics such as unemployment 
and crime rates, urban/rural character, and average wage levels as some of the theories 
predict. The social background of SPR-RSČ is analysed next. In conclusion, we attempt 
to forecast the future of extreme right-wing parties in Czech parliamentary politics. 
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2. A Brief History of the SPR-RSČ 
The existence of political parties was restricted in communist Czechoslovakia. Sartori 
accurately describes the situation as a political system of a hegemonic party [Sartori 
1976]. After November 1989, however, political competition was enabled and there was 
room for the establishment of new parties, the re-establishment of parties that existed 
prior to the Communists’ seizure of power or those that survived the communist era as 
members of the National Front2 under the leadership of the Communist Party. In June 
1990, the Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic registered 35 new political enti-
ties [Fiala, Mareš and Pšeja 1999]. However, only 13 parties and coalitions competed for 
votes in the June elections. 
The SPR-RSČ was one of the new political players, and its history is quite straight-
forward and typical for that period. The committee in charge of establishing the Republi-
can Party met on December 2, 1989 for the first time [Fiala and Mareš 1997a: 110]. In 
February 1990, the constituent convention met, and Republican leaders declared that 
SPR-RSČ was an “extreme right-wing party” [Fiala and Mareš 1998: 99]. In the 1990 
elections, SPR-RSČ ran in a coalition with Všelidová demokratická strana (Democratic 
Party of All People, “VDS”) and failed, gaining only about 1% of all votes (see Table 2).3 
The coalition did not last long though. Soon after it broke up the percentage of SPR-RSČ 
supporters rapidly increased. Within one year, i.e. by June 1991, the percentage of voters 
supporting the Republicans rose from 1% to 6% [Ibid.]. Moreover, surveys showed that 
shortly after the elections the social composition of Republican voters already resembled 
voters of right-wing extremist parties in western countries. Republicans were mainly sup-
ported by younger, less educated men, particularly manual labourers living in large cities. 
By June 1991 the fundaments of the party’s success were set up. The party found its tar-
get voters and succeeded in attracting a substantial part of them. 
Table 2. Election results of SPR-RSČ by year and type of assembly (in %) 
 ČSFR ČR 
 1990* 1992 1996 1998 
FS-SL 0.94 6.48 
FS-SN 1.00 6.37 
ČNR (PS) 1.00 5.98 8.01 3.90 
Senate - - n/a n/a 
Source: Czech Statistical Office. 
Notes: For an explanation of abbreviations, see Appendix 2. 
*) In 1990, the party also ran in the elections in Slovakia. But the percentage of votes 
gained was even smaller than in the Czech Republic. 
In 1990 and 1992 we note the election gains in the elections into the Czech National 
Council; for the years 1996 and 1998 we note the gains in the elections into the 
Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament. 
In 1990 SPR-RSČ ran in a coalition whose complete name was “Všelidová demo- 
kratická strana-Sdružení pro republiku-Republikánská strana Československa”. 
                                                     
2) From 1948 all legal political parties were organised as a single entity called the National Front. 
3) In the Czech Republic, elections have been and continue to be organised according to the pro-
portional rule. Thus, only parties that receive more than 5% of valid votes gain seats in the Parlia-
ment. 
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During the period from 1990 until the second post-communist elections, the political sys-
tem was being shaped. An era of more traditional political parties followed [Fiala, Mareš 
and Pšeja 1999]. In the elections of June 1992, however, only two parties that had not 
been represented in the Parliament before gained parliamentary seats: centre-oriented 
Liberální a sociální unie (Liberal and Social Union) and the extreme right-wing SPR-
RSČ. The SPR-RSČ gained 5.98% of the votes (see Table 2) and 14 seats in the Czech 
National Council. Between 1992 and 1996 the party was not yet consolidated internally 
and lost half of its deputies as they switched to other political parties. There were only 
five Republican deputies left in October 1995 [Fiala and Mareš 1997b; Olson 1997]. 
Figure 1. Support for SPR-RSČ in public opinion polls and in elections, 1990-1999 (in %) 
 
Source: Czech Statistical Office, STEM (Trends). 
 
The polls showed that the Republicans maintained their public support between 1992 and 
1996. About 3 to 4% of voters were reported to support them. However it would not have 
been enough to succeed in the political competition. It was not until three months before 
the elections scheduled for June 1996 that Republican preferences exceeded the 5% 
threshold. Namely, surveys carried out in March 1996 predicted 6% of voters to cast their 
ballots for SPR-RSČ (see Chart 1) and the forecasted percentage gain was even higher in 
following three months. In the end SPR-RSČ received 8.01% of the votes and became the 
fifth strongest party in the country. Since a minority government was formed after the 
elections with merely 99 members in the 200-member Chamber of Deputies, the impor-
tance of the Republican vote increased enormously. The Republicans became very active 
particularly in taking advantage of deputies’ appeals to the government. Their activities 
peaked when the session of the Chamber of Deputies was broadcast on television. Their 
active and skilful use of the media was suspected of drawing new voters to the party. 
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The sequence of Republican successes was slightly interrupted in fall 1996 when 
the first elections to the Senate, the upper chamber of the Czech Parliament, took place. 
The Republicans had decided not to run in these elections long before. Their reasons were 
quite salient. First, they rejected the existence of the Senate as such, and second, the elec-
toral formula provided only a slim chance that any Republican candidate could be 
elected.4 Since the Republican decision regarding Senate elections received considerable 
media coverage, it further contributed to their established, anti-system status. 
In 1997, the Czech Republic experienced not only a political crisis and the fall of 
the Klaus minority government, but also rising economic problems (external economic 
instability, rising unemployment and stagnating economic growth). Since an economic 
crisis creates a favourable environment for militant, extremist and authoritarian attitudes 
[see e.g. Legget 1964; Street and Legget 1961; Večerník 1995], it seemed that in the early 
elections to the Parliament in June, 1998, the SPR-RSČ would gain even more votes than 
in 1996. Public opinion polls also reported increasing and more openly declared support 
for the Republicans (see Chart 1). Since autumn 1996, the Republicans had not dropped 
below 5% in the polls, climaxing in spring 1998 with 8%. In spite of the many optimistic 
anticipations, the SPR-RSČ gained only 3.9% in the elections and disappeared from par-
liamentary politics. 
A brief survey of the history shows that a number of extreme right-wing parties 
that had been successful in the past ended up losing. The Danish Fremskridtspartiet al-
most doubled the number of its votes in 1988 (its actual gain was 9%). Ten years later it 
is no longer a relevant political party as only 2.4% voted for the party in the last elections 
(see Table 1). In Sweden, Ny Demokrati gained 6.8% in 1991, i.e. one year after the party 
was established. Currently, the party has no say in top politics, as only a minimum num-
ber of voters support it. 
Giovanni Sartori asserts that a political system will usually absorb anti-system par-
ties. He claims: “The historian will inevitably discover that in the long run, revolutionary 
parties lose their original impetus and accommodate themselves to the regimes they have 
been unable to overthrow” [Sartori 1976: 140-141]. However, he admits that “the long 
run” usually turns out to be too long for living players and for the political system [Ibid.: 
140-141]. Radical right-wing parties may also experience a decrease in support and mar-
ginalisation. The Republican party in Germany is another salient example. In spite of 
being rather successful at the beginning, they do not play an important role on the state-
wide level any more. Bettina Westle and Oskar Niedermayer assert that other parties have 
regained a significant share of the protest voters that had joined the Republicans for a 
while [Westle and Niedermayer 1992: 98]. However, there are a number of western coun-
tries in which extreme right-wing parties have been and continue to be successful. The 
following section sums up theories regarding the rise of the extreme right in modern so-
cieties. 
3. Explaining the Success of the Extreme Right 
Piero Ignazi [1996: 557-560] suggests that the success of extreme right-wing parties 
stems from a post-industrial crisis of identity. He asserts that racist and xenophobic de-
mands for protection of the national identity are a reaction to the atomisation of modern 
                                                     
4) The elections to the Senate are organised according to the absolute (i.e. two-round) majority 
principle. 
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life, where “the success and individualism interfere with a protective network of tradi-
tional bonds”. Consequently, anomie is strengthening. Thus Ignazi links “the loss of ef-
fective roots” with authoritarian attitudes.5 All sorts of extremists easily operate on this 
ground. A stricter stand on national identity, refugees, law, order, the role of political 
parties, and democracy in general then results in the domination of the right by extremist 
parties. 
Betz [1993] attributes the rise of extreme right-wing parties to the emergence of 
post-industrial society and to the increasing costs of accelerated modernisation [cf. Robe-
jšek 1997]. The importance of skilled labour in management, research, development and 
consulting is increasing, as is the demand for higher education, more skills and longer 
work experience. However, the rewards for unskilled or semi-skilled work in manufactur-
ing are continually decreasing. Post-industrial society splits into two parts. Two thirds 
comprise the rich and educated middle class individuals (employees, public administra-
tors, professionals and blue-collar workers employed in a post-fordian factory). The re-
maining one-third consists mainly of unskilled and semi-skilled workers in manufacturing 
sectors, the long-term unemployed and under-educated young people with minimal work 
experience. 
In another article, Betz [1993] attributes the success of the extreme right-wing par-
ties to a coincidence of interests of a fraction of the working class and segments of the 
lower-middle and new middle classes. He argues that workers feel threatened by con-
strained opportunities, rising unemployment, insufficient education and poor housing 
conditions and ventilate their anger on immigrants. However, parts of the lower-middle 
and new middle classes identify with the programme of lower taxes, bureaucracy cuts, 
dismantling welfare programs and limited state intervention into the private lives of citi-
zens. The political success of the extreme right-wing parties is thus based not only on 
socially marginalised groups, i.e. “losers” in the process of modernisation, but also on its 
“winners” [Ibid.: 423]. 
A high unemployment rate is usually positively correlated with the rise of the ex-
treme right [Dvořáková 1997, Kříž 1998]. The co-existing influx of immigrants and a 
high unemployment rate provides the extremists with a strong argument. They frequently 
publicly declare that immigrants “take jobs away from our people”. Moreover, immi-
grants are said to contribute to a high crime rate. Right-wing extremists usually also em-
ploy a protection-of-national-interest-and-identity argument [Heywood 1994: 175].6 They 
also often claim that the right of the development of other cultures should be protected 
[Dvořáková 1997: 15-16]. 
Kitschelt [1991] assumes that the situation is most favourable for the rise of right-
wing extremists when existing parties fail to satisfy demands for open economy and au-
thoritarian politics. Furthermore, frictions among existing conservative parties or their 
shift towards the centre may open room for right-wing radicalism. If left-oriented parties 
gravitate towards the centre as well, the chances of extremists rise even more. The simi-
larity of left- and right-wing parties may then alienate more authoritarian voters and drain 
them to extremist parties. 
                                                     
5) Rabušic and Mareš [1996] showed that right-wing extremists tended to display the highest de-
gree of anomie in the entire population. 
6) See e.g. Betz’s quotes of official documents of the French National Front [Betz 1993: 417]. 
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The ability to mobilise non-voters is a key feature of the extreme right [Betz 1993; 
Veugelers 1997]. Ignazi [1996] asserts that the mobilisation of new resources, i.e. citizens 
that do not support the system and feel alienated from politics, is a principal trait of right-
wing extremism. Previously non-politicised topics such as morals, immigration, national 
pride, etc. are in the core of their agenda. Lipset [1960], for example, demonstrated that 
the mobilisation of non-voters in the early 1930s significantly contributed to NSDAP’s 
electoral success. Italian fascism also came to power by mobilising non-voters [Brustein 
1991]. 
Radical political programmes also often attract first-time voters. They usually lack 
political stability, tend to be less conservative, incline to radical solutions and are more 
sensitive to emerging political topics. Betz [1993] believes that younger people are dis-
proportionately disadvantaged by modernisation, and are therefore more strongly moti-
vated to join protest parties. This is the case of the French National Front [Veugelers 
1997], the Progress Party in Norway, FPÖ in Austria and Republicans in Germany [Betz 
1993], and the National Front in the U.K. [Husbands 1981]. Although existing empirical 
evidence is rather scattered (due to insufficient representation of voters and supporters of 
extremist parties in the polls) and unequivocal judgements are hard to make, Harrop and 
Miller [1987: 203] believe it is a general pattern of behaviour of political, younger gen-
erations. However, young people join extremists only under specific circumstances. It is 
because young people are most frequently absent from the polls [c.f. Freedman and Gold-
stein 1996, Pattie and Johnston 1998]. Non-voting and extremist voting appear to be in 
some sense substitutes in the political behaviour of young generations. 
The relationship between deviant voting behaviour and inconsistent social status is 
a classical sociological topic [see Lenski 1967; Rush 1967; Matějů and Kreidl 1999]. 
However, “deviant” may have different meanings in this context. While Lenski argues 
that status inconsistency leads to stronger liberalism, Rush refers to right-wing extrem-
ism. Since Slomczynski [1995] concluded that post-communist countries show high lev-
els of status inconsistency, right-wing extremism might possibly flourish there. Recent 
analyses, however, show that high status inconsistency is associated with higher odds of 
left voting [Matějů and Kreidl 1999]. 
Party and electoral systems are to be included in our analysis as well. Sartori ar-
gued that the number of anti-system parties is a primordial characteristic of “polarised 
pluralism” [Sartori 1976: 132-140]. Research inspired by Sartori’s ideas showed that a 
multi-party system and an electoral system of proportional representation are favourable 
conditions for the rise of radical right-wing parties. It also turned out that a higher elec-
tion threshold (minimal number of votes necessary for a party to gain parliamentary rep-
resentation) prevents the rise of extremists [Jackman and Volpert 1996].7 
Numerous authors also note that neo-conservatism throughout the 1980s also 
played a significant role in the rise of extremist parties. Ignazi [1992] asserts that due to 
                                                     
7) In France, the National Front has one seat in the National Council (elected in one-mandate dis-
tricts) in spite of the fact that it gains 15% of the votes. Jean Marie Le Pen, the party leader, is a 
member of the European Parliament which is elected according to a proportional principle. Austra-
lia offers yet another example. The One Nation party has only one seat in the Senate, which is 
elected through a preferential system in twelve-seat constituencies and two-seat territorial con-
stituencies. It has no seats in the House of Representatives, which is elected in single-seat con-
stituencies. (However, it has eleven seats in the Parliament of the State of Queensland). 
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the onset of neo-conservatism in western democracies, the polarisation increased from the 
point of view of both ideological distance and intensity. Based on Sartori, it could be 
argued that neo-conservatism caused a rise in the polarisation of political systems in the 
1980s. 
Veugelers [1997] convincingly argues that the long-term success of extremist par-
ties is determined by a more complex set of relationships. Many theories regarding the 
initial success and entry of radical right-wing parties into politics are correct, Veugelers 
argues, however, that they are incomplete. He adds that these parties have to succeed in 
creating new “party loyalty” to sustain themselves and thus overcome marginalisation. 
Two steps have to be taken for the party to become successful. While the initial success 
happens due to the weakened ties of voters to existing parties (issue voting) and non-voter 
mobilisation, parties can only remain relevant if new party identification gradually devel-
ops. 
4. Social Background of the Extreme Right 
Lipset [1960] argued that fascism was not a right-wing movement. He viewed it as an 
extremism of the centre, a typical movement of the old middle class, i.e. of self-employed 
people, entrepreneurs and craftsmen. Even though middle class individuals desire lower 
taxes (a typical conservative claim) – they do not favour unbridled capitalism. They feel 
threatened by multi-national corporations, strong trade unions and national monopolies. 
Therefore, they call for state intervention and protection (which would rank them on the 
left). For Lipset, this mixture suggests that it is more correct to place fascism to the centre 
rather than to the right wing of the political spectrum. Novák [1997: 57] suggests that the 
most typical examples of real right-wing extremism are “horthyism” in Hungary and Sa-
lazar’s regime in Portugal. 
What is the typical social background of right-wing extremism? Veugelers [1997] 
showed that the social profile of the voters of the French National Front corresponds to 
Lipset’s argument. Extreme right voters in France significantly differ from traditional 
conservative voters (mostly women, older people and active Catholics). Men and young 
people are also the most frequent voters of the Progress Party in Norway, the Republicans 
in Germany and the National Front in the U.K. [Betz 1993; Husbands 1981]. The Aus-
trian FPÖ was popular not only among workers and employees but also among retired 
people. The French National Front was the most successful among the middle and lower-
middle classes, receiving also high support from workers. Similarly, the Norwegian Pro-
gress Party gained support among white- as well as blue-collar workers [Betz 1993]. 
Blue-collar workers were also the key voters of the Republicans in Germany and the 
Flemish Block in Belgium. 
Surprisingly, Jackman and Volpert [1996] did not find a significant correlation be-
tween support for radical parties in Germany and France and social status and income. 
Other researchers, however, argue that there is a relationship between social position and 
extremist voting. Westle and Niedermayer [1992] concluded that while there was no rela-
tionship between low income and extremist voting in Germany, a relationship between 
subjective deprivation and inclination towards the Republicans existed. A disproportion-
ately high percentage of Republican supporters believed that they were structurally disad-
vantaged and/or considered their economic situation as bad. However, in Norway, there is 
a tendency among low-income voters to support the Progress Party [Betz 1993]. 
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Education is another method for rendering social status operational and may have a 
substantial impact on voting behaviour. First, educated people face lower risks of mod-
ernisation, are usually more successful on the labour market and do not face the competi-
tion of immigrants on the labour market, since immigrants tend to be under-educated. In 
1989, only 61% of Gastarbeiters in Austria had completed elementary education. In spe-
cific sub-populations this percentage is even higher, reaching as much as 84% within the 
Turkish one. The situation was similar in Germany and France [Betz 1993]. Second, edu-
cation is also closely related to the process of political socialisation. Westle and Nieder-
mayer [1992] believe that the higher the level of school a person attends, the more deeply 
they are socialised with valid standards of the political system [see also Klingemann and 
Pappi 1972]. Higher education achieved in a democratic system thus provides a guarantee 
of immunity to authoritarian tendencies. Third, the affiliation of less educated people with 
extremism may be caused by their more pronounced need for a clear world-view. Less 
educated people may lack the cognitive tools necessary to deal with the changing charac-
ter of modern society. They may also lack the tolerance and experience needed for under-
standing complex social and political phenomena [Westle and Niedermayer 1992]. 
However, no relationship between education and political extremism has been reported in 
most countries. Veugelers [1997] argues that there is often a non-linear relationship that 
is not so easily discovered. He demonstrated that while graduates of technical and busi-
ness schools tended to support the French National Front, people with an educational 
background in the humanities did not [Ibid.: 34]. 
Supporters of extreme right-wing parties tend to be concentrated in urban areas 
where the negative aspects of modernisation are more salient [Husbands 1981; Voerman 
and Lucardie 1992]. Furthermore, unemployed youth and unskilled workers usually live 
in suburbs side by side with their competitors on the labour market, i.e. immigrants. 
When immigration to lower-class suburbs occurs, their original inhabitants feel that their 
homes are being surrounded and invaded. They may feel trapped in the structure of mod-
ern society, abandoned by the better off, and with no hope of overcoming their lot. Tradi-
tionally left-oriented workers then switch to the extreme right, as left-oriented parties do 
not meet their demands on immigration [Betz 1993]. Betz [1993] also suggests that right-
wing extremists will enjoy higher popularity in more prosperous regions (such as Lom-
bardy, Flanders, Bavaria and Baden-Würtemberg) where dissatisfaction with citizens of 
poorer regions and disapproval of domestic redistribution complement anti-immigrant 
sentiments [Betz 1993]. 
Voters of extreme right-wing parties have very diverse political backgrounds. 
Some researchers report that the extreme right attracts voters across the political spectrum 
[Betz 1993]. In the French presidential elections, Le Pen gained support from people who 
considered themselves clearly left-oriented. These individuals amounted to 15% of Le 
Pen’s supporters [Veugelers 1997]. Husbands [1981] emphasises that almost one half of 
the Italian MSI voters belonged to the moderate or extreme left in the 1970s.8 Similarly, 
Westle and Niedermayer [1992] show that a significant percentage of voters of the Ger-
                                                     
8) This classification was based on attitudes and values, i.e. the scale that could be called “objec-
tive”, in contrast to the more common method of the respondent’s self-placement on a left-right 
scale. Husbands, however, notes that the classification was troublesome methodologically. More-
over, the MSI voters comprised only 2% of the sample and results are thus highly unreliable [Hus-
bands 1981]. 
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man Republicans claimed to be left-oriented. Moreover, between one-fifth and one-
seventh of them declared that they had voted for Social Democracy in the previous elec-
tions. However, most of them came from the CDU-CSU. There were no significant dif-
ferences between Republican and CDU-CSU voters in terms of their position on the left-
right scale. 
Information on voter inflows and outflows may help place extreme right voters in 
the political space and determine which parties are their main competitors. Mair’s “theory 
of persistence” needs to be mentioned [Mair 1989]. Mair argues that even though modern 
party systems experience higher voting volatility, shifts from left- to right-wing parties 
and vice versa are rather rare. Most of the increase in voters’ mobility occurs within rela-
tively stable left- and right-wing blocks. Consequent research confirmed Mair’s conclu-
sions [e.g. Heath et al. 1991]. Persistence theory predicts that right-wing extremist parties 
would recruit new voters mostly from the body of moderate conservative voters. 
Veugelers [1997] and Westle and Niedermayer [1992] supported Mair’s theory empiri-
cally. On the other hand, Betz [1993] and Ignazi [1992] oppose the persistence thesis, 
asserting that right-wing extremists are able to mobilise voters from all social strata and 
political parties and thus cannot be considered rightist. 
5. SPR-RSČ in 1996 and 1998: Success and Failure 
In the following section, we analyse the results of the 1996 and 1998 elections into the 
lower chamber of the Czech Parliament. We try to show to what extent the above men-
tioned theories could be applied to right-wing extremism in the Czech Republic. First, we 
will explore electoral mobility between extreme-right and other left- and right-wing par-
ties. Then we will focus on the relationship between election results and their regional 
correlates. The third part of the analysis will discuss the success of the Czech Republi-
cans in addressing traditional extremist voters. Finally, we will summarise the potential 
causes of their failure in the 1998 elections. 
Voters’ mobility in the 1992-1998 period 
Vlachová [1997] emphasised that the Republicans were the only relevant political party 
in the Czech Republic that did not stress the left-right scale in its programme. On aver-
age, Republican voters defined themselves as right-wing, but with a high variance. Voters 
perceived the party as a centre-oriented one [Šimoník 1996]. A value-based analysis of 
1996 data showed that Republican voters were located in the centre of the left-right scale 
and were closer to the authoritarian end of the libertarianism-authoritarianism scale [Vla-
chová and Matějů 1998: 162]. Both these findings supported the hypothesis about the 
“extremism of the centre”. 
Voter mobility between 1992 and 1996 confirmed the position of the SPR-RSČ be-
tween the left- and right-wing parties. They surprisingly showed its stronger inclination to 
the left. This bias, however, may be because SPR-RSČ joined the left-oriented parties in 
their opposition within the Parliament. In comparison to 1992, the Republicans gained 
17% of voters from right-wing parties (only 7% from left-oriented ones) and lost 28% to 
left-oriented parties (9% to right-wing ones) in the 1996 elections. In 1998, the situation 
looked similar. The Republicans were gaining more votes from the right-wing parties 
(14% in comparison to 7% from left-oriented ones) and losing more votes to left-oriented 
parties (37% in comparison to 8% to right-wing ones). This corresponded to a new posi-
tion on the left-right and libertarian-authoritarian scales of the Republican voters discov-
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ered in 1998, when SPR-RSČ voters clearly belonged to the left-wing of the political 
spectrum [Vlachová 1999: 264]. We believe that this may help comprehend the failure of 
Republicans in the 1998 elections. 
Table 3. Inflow and outflow of SPR-RSČ voters. Balance with left- and right-
wing parties in 1996 and 1998 elections (in %) 
 Left Right 
 inflow outflow inflow outflow 
1996 +7 -28 +17 -9 
1998 +7 -37 +14 -8 
Note: Percentages always refer to previous elections. E.g. 7% of people who 
in 1992 voted left, voted SPR-RSČ in 1996. Similarly, 28% of people 
who voted SPR-RSČ in 1992 voted left in 1996. 
Source: 1996, 1998 exit poll data, SC&C/IFES for the Czech television. 
 
The polls did not indicate that SPR-RSČ was losing voters before the elections. The 
STEM research agency reported that 8% of the population was going to vote for SPR-
RSČ in March of 1998. It was suspected that the election campaign could draw many new 
voters to SPR-RSČ. Furthermore, sociologists predicted that actual preferences of SPR-
RSČ might be even higher since many SPR-RSČ supporters tend not to indicate their true 
preferences in the polls. Anticipated SPR-RSČ support was therefore higher than the 
polls actually showed. However, the situation turned out to be exactly the opposite. A 
significant number of those who originally claimed to vote for SPR-RSČ in the polls must 
have switched to another party. Where did they go? 
Table 4. Second votes of SPR-RSČ supporters in October 1996 and April 1998. Line per-
centages and adjusted residuals (in parentheses)9 
        Other 
 KSČM DŽJ ČSSD KDU-ČSL US ODS ODA parties 
1996 
SPR-RSČ voters 10.5 5.3 21.1 7.9 - 10.5 7.9 36.8 
 (1.8) (0.6) (2.3) (-0.6) - (0.6) (-1.5) (-1.2) 
Other voters 6.7 5.4 18.4 16.6 - 12 25.8 15.2 
 (-1.8) (-0.6) (-2.3) (0.6) - (-0.6) (1.5) (1.2) 
1998 
SPR-RSČ voters 19.1 9.2 37.2 4.3 4.3 6.4 - 22.3 
 (4.0) (-0.9) (5.0) (-3.4) (-3.3) (-1.0) - (0.4) 
Other voters 7.5 9.4 18 17.8 17.6 9.9 - 19.4 
 (-4.0) (0.9) (-5.0) (3.4) (3.3) (1.0) - (-0.4) 
χ296 = 11.32, sig. = 0.079, n = 1030 
χ298 = 55.00, sig. = 0.000, n = 1551 
 
Source: ISSP 1996, “Trends” 4/1998 (STEM) 
                                                     
9) During the application of the adjusted residual, considering the small representation of Republi-
can voters in the set, we follow the recommendation of Řehák and Řeháková. They recommend 
using these statistics in the case that all the minimal expected frequencies in the table are higher or 
equal to 0.5 [Řehák and Řeháková 1978: 624]. 
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Table 4 shows the second votes of the Republican supporters which may provide an an-
swer. A comparison of 1996 and 1998 distributions is particularly interesting here. While 
37% of the SPR-RSČ voters specified clearly left-oriented parties (ČSSD, KSČM and 
DŽJ) as their second choice in 1996, the percentage went up to two thirds in 1998! ČSSD 
was the most popular second choice party with 21% and 37% in 1996 and 1998 respec-
tively. KSČM was the second most acceptable party with 10.5% and 19.1% in 1996 and 
1998 respectively. Also DŽJ (the Pensioners’ party) strengthened its position among Re-
publican voters, since its ratio of second votes increased from 5.2% to 9.2%. The in-
creased outflow of Republican voters to the left in the 1996-1998 period (see Table 3) 
indicates that many voters that had been considering a left-oriented party as a “back-up” 
option in the end succumbed to the increasing left-oriented temptation. The following 
analysis will explain in more detail the reasons for the transformed value and voting pref-
erences of the SPR-RSČ voters. 
Regional variation in right-wing extremist voting 
Voting behaviour is affected both by individual and geographical characteristics. In this 
section we would like to explore the latter, which usually reflect the opportunity structure 
individuals face in their lives. We merely focus on the association between voting behav-
iour and some regional characteristics in the two election years of our interest, namely 
1996 and 1998. Some scholars assume that a relationship between the economic envi-
ronment (average wage and unemployment) and extreme right election gains should exist. 
This should merely be a result of a tension in the labour market. Furthermore, the radical 
right is usually considered an urban phenomenon. Lastly, we would like to explore the 
relationship between the extreme right and the criminality rate, since, as we have already 
mentioned, appeals to a rising crime rate are frequent parts of the extreme right agenda. 
With regard to the previous sub-chapter, we would like to offer a more in depth view of 
the relationship between SPR-RSČ and left-wing parties. Therefore, we decided to em-
ploy a simultaneous regression analysis, because it is quite flexible in manipulating spe-
cific coefficients in the model. We specified a multi-sample model to compare the 1996 
and 1998 effects (for more convenience the model has been visualised in Diagram 1). We 
used LISREL software to test the model.10 
From the results in Table 5 we can see that the structure of effects was nearly iden-
tical in both years. However, in 1998 the percentage of explained variation was higher. 
The effect of unemployment on voting for the SPR-RSČ is apparent. The same holds true 
for the regional crime rate. It should come as no surprise that a rising crime rate and un-
employment contribute to voting for extreme right-wing parties. However, it is surprising 
that there is a net negative relationship between population density and election gains of 
the SPR-RSČ. Actually, not only is the net effect negative, product moment correlations 
(not reported here) show that this effect is negative even without controls. SPR-RSČ thus 
appears to be a rural rather than an urban party. There is no relationship between extreme 
right voting and average wage. Therefore, the hypothesis of a relationship between “re-
gional poverty” and an inclination toward extremism does not hold. Betz [1993], how-
ever, stated that support of extreme right-wing parties is stronger in richer regions of the 
country. Nevertheless, this opposing hypothesis does not hold either. 
                                                     
10) Correlation matrices and input LISREL files necessary for reproducing the analysis are avail-
able from the authors upon request. 
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Table 5. Simultaneous regression analysis of election results of SPR-RSČ and 
left-wing parties on regional characteristics in 1996 and 1998 - satu-
rated model (N=77) 
 1996 1998 
 SPR-RSČ (y1) Left (y2) SPR-RSČ (y1) Left (y2) 
Average income (x1) 0.02 -0.08 0.01 -0.17 
Unemployment rate (x2) 0.48*** 0.65*** 0.63*** 0.68*** 
Criminality (x3) 0.33** 0.1 0.36*** 0.04 
Density of population (x4) -0.30** -0.23** -0.26** -0.16 
 
Explained variance 0.33 0.51 0.52 0.56 
Note: * statistically significant at level 0.1; ** statistically significant at 
level 0.05; *** statistically significant at level 0.01 
Prague is considered as one region in the analysis. 
Explanation of variables: Income = average personal income in the region. Unem-
ployment = for the year 1996 we use the average regional unemployment rate calcu-
lated for the whole year, for 1998 - we use the unemployment rate as reported by 
May 31st, 1998. Crime = relative criminality in the region (number of registered 
crimes per 1000 inhabitants (1996). Density of population per km2. Left wing parties 
are defined for the respective years as follows. In 1996: ČSSD (Czechoslovak Social 
Democracy), DŽJ (Pensioners for Life Securities), KSČM (Communist Party of Bo-
hemia and Moravia), LB (Left Block), SDL (Party of the Democratic Left). In 1998- 
ČSSD, DŽJ, KSČM. See e.g. [Fiala, Mareš and Pšeja 1999] for the party system de-
velopment and [Večerník and Matějů 1999: 354-355] for party names and their ab-
breviations. 
 
Diagram 1. Simultaneous regression analysis of election results of SPR-RSČ and 
left-wing parties on regional characteristics 
income
unempl
crime
density
SPR-
RSC
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Note: see Table 5 for details. 
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The saturated model (Table 5) suggests that the relationship between the Republicans’ 
election gains and unemployment strengthened between 1996 and 1998. However, can 
this change be proven as statistically significant? To be able to answer this question, we 
set up an alternative model imposing the condition of equal effect of unemployment on 
the SPR-RSČ gains in 1996 and 1998 (gamma112 = gamma212). To answer the above ques-
tion, we need to examine whether the change in chi square exceeded the critical limit 
defined for the one degree of freedom we gained by the change. As the first line of Table 
6 shows, the model is statistically acceptable even when the restrictions are included (χ2 = 
1.39 with 1 degree of freedom). This means that in spite of a significant increase in un-
employment from 1996 till 1998, the election gains of the SPR-RSČ did not increase as 
anticipated. 
Table 6. Simultaneous regression analysis of election results of SPR-RSČ and 
left-wing parties on regional characteristics in 1996 and 1998  
– restricted models 
 χ2 Df p RMR GFI 
γ112 = γ212 1.39 1 0.24 0.023 1.00 
γ112 = γ212 = γ122 = γ222 3.57 3 0.31 0.019 1.00 
Note: Variables and model are defined in Tab. 5 and Diagram 1 
 
There are, however, other questions at stake. If the Republicans did not take advantage of 
the increased unemployment, did the left-wing parties benefit from it? Did the effects of 
unemployment on the election gains of left-wing and extreme right parties differ? The 
second line of Table 6 shows statistics of the fit for model 3, where three conditions of 
equality were specified, We get a chi square of 3.57 with 3 degrees of freedom here, 
which again meets the basic criterion of acceptability. The conclusion that follows is ap-
parent. All four effects of the regional unemployment rate on the election results of the 
extreme right and left are identical in 1996 and 1998. 
Mobilisation of non-voters 
14% of those who did not participate in the 1992 elections and came to the polls in 1996 
(including the first-time voters) voted for the Republicans. In 1998, the absolute percent-
age of those who did not vote in 1996 and voted in 1998 amounted to 4.8%. The Republi-
cans therefore failed to achieve an above-average mobilisation of non-voters in 1998. We 
argue that the failure to mobilise previous non-voters accounts for the bad election results 
of the Republicans in general. A specific analysis of first-time voters (otherwise a sub-
group of non-voters) provides us with a similar result. 13.3% of first-time voters cast their 
ballots for the Republicans in 1996, which comprised 12.6% of all SPR-RSČ voters. No 
party had a higher representation of first-time voters in its electorate [Vlachová and 
Kreidl 1998]. In 1998, a mere 5.1% of first-time voters voted for the SPR-RSČ. Then 
only one out of twenty of the SPR-RSČ voters was a first-time voter (see Table 7). 
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Table 7. Preferences of first-time and other voters in the 1996 and 1998 elections in the 
Czech Republic. Adjusted residuals in parentheses 
        Other 
 KSČM ČSSD SPR-RSČ KDU-ČSL US ODS ODA parties 
1996 
Mature voters 10.8 26.5 7.6 8.1 - 29.6 6.1 11.2 
 (7.2) (0.7) (-6.6) (0.5) - (-0.8) (-3.8) (1.4) 
First-time voters 3.8 25.5 13.3 7.7 - 30.8 9.1 9.8 
 (-7.2) (-0.7) (6.6) (-0.5) - (0.8) (3.8) (-1.4) 
1998 
Mature voters 11.2 32.3 3.8 8.9 8.6 27.7 - 7.5 
 (4.0) (-0.2) (-1.5) (-0.5) (-1.3) (-0.1) - (-1.1) 
First-time voters 5.7 32.7 5.1 9.6 10.2 28.0 - 8.7 
 (-4.0) (0.2) (1.5) (0.5) (1.3) (0.1) - (1.1) 
χ296 = 102.76, sig. = 0.000, n = 13,890 
χ298 = 18.89, sig. = 0.005, n = 13,312 
 
Source: 1996, 1998 exit poll data, SC&C/IFES for Czech television. 
 
Young voters, first-time voters in particularly, tend to comprise a significant part of the 
electorate of extremist parties and, as we have seen, probably have accounted for a sub-
stantial part of the drop of SPR-RSČ votes between 1996-1998. We can only estimate to 
what extent the election results were affected by the fact that the elections were early. 
This meant that only two one-year population cohorts of the first-time voters participated 
in the elections rather than four cohorts as is the case in regular elections. According to 
the statistical data, there were approximately 330,000 first-time voters in 1998 as com-
pared to 770,000 in 1996. However, the smaller body of potential voters should not over-
shadow the failure of the recruitment process. As we have seen in Table 7, there was not a 
significantly higher tendency among first-time voters to vote for the Republicans in 1998. 
First-time voters usually significantly contribute to changing election results. Since 
their representation in the population is decreasing (a consequence of the 1970s popula-
tion boom which was followed by a drop in fertility), we might predict more stable elec-
tion results for the future. Furthermore, it seems that the new generation of voters merely 
copies the voting behaviour of the entire population. A relatively new era of Czech poli-
tics seems to be coming, as we observe a pattern different from the early 1990s when 
young voters tended to vote for moderate and extreme right-wing parties (see Table 7). 
Social characteristics of the SPR-RSČ voters 
In this section, we are going to look at the individual social characteristics of SPR-RSČ 
voters and will compare them to a typical profile of an extremist voter in other European 
countries. We are using a logistic regression in the analysis with a dummy “VOTESPR-
RSC” as the dependent variable (1 = voted for the SPR-RSČ, 0 = voted for another party). 
The analysis is based on data from exit-poll surveys carried out by the SC&C and IFES 
consortium for Czech Television in 1996 and 1998.11 We use a set of exploratory vari-
                                                     
11) The surveys comprising 13,000 respondents each year overcome the usual problems related to 
low representation of the Republican voters. In addition, they include only actual voters, which 
eliminates distortions due to respondents stating unreliable information related to their participa-
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ables here, all of them are described in the Appendix. The analysis has been performed 
using 1996 and 1998 exit poll files and a dummy variable distinguishing both years was 
included in some models. 
For the results of the logistic regression models see Table 8. All three models say, 
with some modifications, the same thing. It seems that the profile of the Czech Republi-
cans corresponds to that of voters of the extreme right in other countries [cf. Betz 1993; 
Husbands 1981; Schuster 1996; Veugelers 1997; Voerman and Lucardie 1992; Westle 
and Niedermayer 1992]. Furthermore, the inclination of certain social groups to vote for 
the Republicans seems to be stable over time. As we see from the higher level models no 
interaction effect with the year turned out to be statistically significant (Table 9). 
While men showed an above-average inclination to vote for the Republicans, 
women were significantly less likely to support extremists. SPR-RSČ was attractive for 
first-time and young voters, failing to attract “experienced” voters. Consequently the 
party did not have a stable electorate. Surprisingly, the effect of absenteeism in previous 
elections (NONLAST) is not significant in model I. For this reason, we did not include 
the YOUNG variable in models II and III in order to show that it was only due to the 
overlapping effect of the YOUNG and NONLAST and YOUNG and FIRST variables. 
That indeed was the case, since the respective metric coefficients increased from 0.08 to 
0.18 and from 0.24 to 0.66. The change is not surprising as young people tend both to 
vote for extreme parties and to be absent from the elections [cf. Freedman and Goldstein 
1996; Pattie and Johnston 1998]. Models II and III also confirm the ability of SPR-RSČ 
to attract previous non-voters. In contradiction to our expectations, the models do not 
show a decreasing ability to mobilise first-time voters and non-voters. 
The voting trend for the Republicans was stronger in 1996 than in 1998, as a logi-
cal result of the election output. SPR-RSČ scored a success among people with lower 
education (no high-school diploma) and in occupations of people with no high-school 
diplomas. Workers (WORKER) that rarely hold high-school diplomas and employees 
(EMPL) also display higher odds of extreme voting. The statistically significant effect of 
the interaction term EMPL*HSCHOOL in model IV (Table 9) is important here, because 
it demonstrates that the probability that an employee would vote for the Republicans is 
significantly reduced if they have obtained higher education. This very finding fits in with 
the hypothesis that the lower-middle class (comprising mostly employees with lower 
education) votes for extremists. The old middle class is also more likely to vote for the 
Republicans. We assumed that education would again play the role of a discriminating 
variable among old middle-class members. However, this assumption was not confirmed. 
Entrepreneurs with both lower and higher education were equally likely to vote for the 
extreme right. The results also show that voting for SPR-RSČ was strongly related to 
unemployment even at the individual level. However, the coefficient remains unchanged 
between 1996 and 1998. 
                                                                                                                                                 
tion in elections. However, these surveys are limited to a few questions and, therefore, do not al-
low for testing all hypotheses on voting behaviour. For more detailed information, please check 
the Webpage of the Sociological Data Archive in Prague (http://archiv.soc.cas.cz), where these 
data sets are deposited and publicly accessible. 
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Table 9. Logistic regression of voting for SPR-RSČ:  
model with interaction effects 
 B Wald Exp(B) 
SEX 0.56*** 96.84 1.75 
NONLAST 0.26** 3.95 1.30 
FIRST 0.58*** 30.28 1.78 
HSCHOOL -0.51*** 34.24 0.60 
WORKER 0.67*** 75.26 1.96 
EMPL 0.61*** 34.47 1.85 
UNEMPL 0.98*** 10.90 2.65 
SELF 0.71*** 34.07 2.04 
RELIG -0.35*** 39.02 0.70 
YEAR -0.65*** 116.38 0.52 
FIRST*YEAR -0.34 2.14 0.71 
NONLAST*YEAR -0.11 0.27 0.90 
UNEMPL*YEAR 0.39 1.35 1.47 
EMPL*HSCHOOL -0.39** 8.00 0.68 
SELF*HSCHOOL -0.24 2.13 0.78 
UNEMPL*HSCHOOL -0.26 0.59 0.77 
Constant -2.87*** 1287.70 
 
PRED (in %)  94.24 
R2  0.076 
Note:  * statistically significant at level 0.1; ** statistically significant at 
level 0.05; *** statistically significant at level 0.01  
Presented statistic R2 is shown as a suitable scale for the explained 
variation [SPSS… 1997]. 
Source: 1996, 1998 exit poll data, SC&C/IFES for Czech television. 
 For a more detailed description of variables see Appendix. 
 
The non-religious tended to vote for the Republicans more frequently than religious peo-
ple [cf. Lipset 1960]. Individualisation and atomisation in modern life are assumed to 
give way to right-wing extremists. As we have seen, some institutions, for example the 
Church, appear to be able to prevent people from political extremes. However, religious 
life need not to be connected to a less atomised life, but may temper political extremism 
in another way. A different study would be necessary to explore the relationships between 
religion and political participation in more detail. Westle and Niedermayer [1992: 95] 
mention trade unions as another institution with a strong socialising effect. In contrast to 
the Church, however, no empirical evidence on trade unions and right-wing extremism 
has ever been found and we can not provide it in our analysis. 
6. Conclusions 
The results of our analysis are hardly astonishing. In the Czech Republic, social groups 
displaying a higher risk of extremist voting resemble those in other countries, i.e. they 
comprise young people, predominantly men, workers and employees with no tertiary 
education, entrepreneurs and non-religious people. Our data cast doubt on the SPR-RSČ 
as an urban phenomenon, because it shows that supporters of the Republicans are concen-
trated in less densely populated areas. First-time voters and non-voters were more likely 
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to favour extremists. The salient inclination of SPR-RSČ voters towards left-wing parties 
challenges the view of the SPR-RSČ as a right-wing party. 
Last but not least, we would like to discuss what prospects the Republicans face. 
There are arguments as well as counter-arguments for their bright prospects. The current 
position of the SPR-RSČ seems rather unfavourable due to their political strategy com-
bining “within system features” with “outside system strategies” (e.g., financial, media 
and other benefits). In the past, Republicans could blame the government for not being 
able to reduce the crime rate, on the one hand, and commit crimes and avoid being prose-
cuted on the other hand. They could libel the government by calling them thieves and at 
the same time misuse the state contributions designated to political parties, as well as 
damage and abuse property of the Parliament.12 The electoral failure in 1998 deprived the 
Republican party of most of these benefits. 
If the psychological effect of the Czech electoral system persisted [Novák 1996: 
410-411], the percentage of votes for the non-parliamentary parties should decrease. This 
trend will most likely apply to SPR-RSČ as well and thus we shall predict a continuous 
deterioration of their electoral support. Moreover, the number of first-time voters will 
decrease and the importance of these voters for the overall election outcome will dimin-
ish. Furthermore, the Republican leaders may not be able to attract their attention, as was 
the case in 1998. Election results are difficult to predict as first-time voters and non-
voters tend to behave in an unpredictable way. 
Even though the extremists may seem to have disappeared from the Czech political 
scene, they may unexpectedly reappear at any time. Kitschelt [1991] suggested that if the 
excessive expectations from the new Social Democratic government were not fulfilled 
and if Social Democracy did not resist centripetal trends, radical movements may be born. 
While Schuster [1996] asserts that the number of manual labourers voting for extreme 
right-oriented parties increased due to their dissatisfaction with the welfare programme of 
the Socialists in Austria, the opposite situation might have occurred in the Czech Repub-
lic: the voters were dissatisfied with the SPR-RSČ welfare programme. After all, that is 
what analyses carried out immediately after the elections showed.13 
                                                     
12) As a member of Parliament, the SPR-RSČ leader for example damaged a bench in the Parlia-
ment and drove an incredible number of kilometres in the car provided to him – reaching an as-
tounding average consumption exceeding 17 litters of gas per 100 kilometres. In the spring of 
1998, the party began falling apart. The party members started leaving and alleged that party lead-
ers had humiliated them, put psychological pressure on them, taken away a significant share of 
their salaries, and spent the funds provided to the party by the government on building villas and 
purchasing expensive cars. The SPR-RSČ was almost unable to organise a traditional (private) 
campaign based on handing out promotion leaflets and organising rallies with Sládek, the party 
leader. However, it was the only party to run for elections that organised a billboard campaign 
with populist mottoes throughout the country while other parties decided to refrain from costly 
billboards during the election campaign due to their financial scandals. The lack of modest attitude 
on the part of the party leaders combined with allegations of the disappointed party members must 
have significantly contributed to the traditional Republican voters – egalitarian and dissatisfied 
with the system – voting for ČSSD, which presented itself as the party that will solve all the prob-
lems the country was facing. 
13) For example, based on modelling shifts of voters, Spousta [1998] showed that the Republicans 
“disappeared” in other left-oriented parties. 
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Another reason why the Republicans were unable to maintain their position as the 
“extremists of the centre” might have been the high polarisation of Czech politics. The 
Czech political environment gradually developed into a scale with two clear poles [Vla-
chová 1997] that work as centres of gravitation. Therefore, the left- and right-wing parties 
were not as easily interchangeable as Kitschelt [1991] suggested. In fact, the differences 
between them kept growing and the parties were only gradually coming to resemble their 
traditional counterparts [Matějů and Vlachová 1998]. The post-1998 election “opposition 
agreement” may play a substantive role in overshadowing differences between left and 
right. By the same token, if unemployment keeps rising while the Social Democratic gov-
ernment is in power, the trend of the Social Democrats attracting extremists voters may 
reverse and lead the voters back to the Republicans or similar parties. If so the future of 
the extreme right would not be bad at all. 
Text translated by Markéta Hálová, tables, figures and diagrams by Petra Rakušanová 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1. Description of variables in models and percentage representation in categories on 
joined set from exit polls from 1996 and 1998 
 percentage 
Variable in category 1 
VOTESPR 1 = voted for SPR RSČ 5 0 = voted for other parties 
SEX 1 = male 50.3 0 = female 
NONLAST 1 = did not attended last election on his/her own will 5.4 0 = others 
FIRST 1 = first-time voters 6.2 0 = others 
YOUNG 1 = age under 29 24.9 0 = others 
HSCHOOL 1 = graduation + tertiary education 57.7 0 = others 
WORKER 1 = worker 16.4 0 = others 
EMPL 1 = employee 31.9 0 = others 
UNEMPL 1 = unemployed 1.6 0 = others 
SELF 1 = self-employed 12.7 0 = others 
RELIG 1 = Christian religion 42.8 0 = others 
YEAR 1 = 1998 48.6 0 = 1996 
 
Appendix 2. Abbreviations used in the text 
Party names: 
Abbrev. Name of the party (English) Name of the party (Czech) 
SPR-RSČ Association for the Republic-  Sdružení pro republiku- 
 Republican Party of Czechoslovakia Republikánská strana Československa 
VDS Democratic Party of All People Všelidová demokratická strana 
KSČM Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia Komunistická strana Čech a Moravy 
LB Left Block Levý blok 
DŽJ Pensioners for Life Guarantees Důchodci za životní jistoty 
SDL Party of the Democratic Left Strana demokratické levice 
ODS Civic Democratic Party Občanská demokratická strana 
ODA Civic Democratic Alliance Občanská demokratická aliance 
US Freedom Union Unie svobody 
KDU-ČSL Christian Democratic Union- Křesťansko demokratická unie- 
 Czechoslovak People’s Party Československá strana lidová 
 
Other Abbreviations: 
Abbrev. Name (English) Name (Czech) 
ČSFR Czech and Slovak Federal Republic Česká a Slovenská federativní republika 
ČR Czech Republic Česká republika 
FS-SL Federal Assembly-Chamber of the People Federální shromáždění-Sněmovna lidu 
FS-SN Federal Assembly-Chamber of Nations Federální shromáždění-Sněmovna národů 
ČNR (PS) Czech National Council (1. 1. 1993  ČNR (1. 1. 1993 Poslanecká sněmovna) 
 transformed into Chamber of Deputies)  
PSP ČR Chamber of Deputies, Parliament of  Poslanecká sněmovna Parlamentu 
 the Czech Republic (Lower Chamber) České republiky 
Senate Senate, Parliament of the Czech Republic  Senát Parlamentu České republiky 
 (Upper Chamber)  
 
